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We propose a new model of computation based on Nonstandard Analysis. Intuitively, the role of
‘algorithm’ is played by a new notion of finite procedure, calledΩ-invariance and inspired by physics,
from Nonstandard Analysis. Moreover, the role of ‘proof’ is taken up by the Transfer Principle
from Nonstandard Analysis. We obtain a number of results in Constructive Reverse Mathematics
to illustrate the tight correspondence to Errett Bishop’s Constructive Analysis and the associated
Constructive Reverse Mathematics.
1 Introduction
Historically, the first models of computation go back to Alan Turing and Alonzo Church [8, 30]. In
order to solve David Hilbert’s famous Entscheidungsproblem in the negative, Church and Turing both
proposed a formal definition of algorithm (resp. the Turing machine and the λ -calculus). In time, it
became clear that these formalisms describe the same computational phenomenon, i.e., the recursive
functions. The importance of the discovery of the Turing machine and the λ -calculus for (what later
would become) Computer Science cannot be underestimated. Nonetheless, these formalisms have certain
limitations. Foremost, they operate on discrete data, i.e., natural numbers (in some representation or
other) are the basic concept. The question naturally arises whether there is a theory of computability
and complexity over real-valued data, i.e., where the basic concept is that of real number. An example
of such a formalism is Computable Analysis (See, e.g., [5, 32]). Moreover, there is even a conference
series1, called CCA, dedicated to computability over the reals. The following is an excerpt from the
scope of CCA.
The conference is concerned with the theory of computability and complexity over real-
valued data. [. . . ] Most mathematical models in physics and engineering [. . . ] are based
on the real number concept. Thus, a computability theory and a complexity theory over the
real numbers and over more general continuous data structures is needed.
An American wordsmith might at this point refer to the legal oath concerning truthful testimony. Indeed,
while the observations made in the above quote are certainly valid, and the existing frameworks for
real-number computability constitute highly respectable academic disciplines, the above observation is
not the whole truth. For instance, an equally valid observation concerning physics and engineering is
that an intuitive calculus with infinitesimals, i.e., informal Nonstandard Analysis, is freely employed. In
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project Philosophical Frontiers in Reverse Mathematics. I thank the John Templeton Foundation for its continuing support for
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necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
1See the website http://cca-net.de/events.html.
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particular, the notorious ‘ε-δ method’, due to Karl Weierstraß, was never adopted, although it hitherto
constitutes the de facto standard in mathematics, especially analysis. These observations concerning
physics and engineering beg the question whether a notion of computability can be developed which is
directly based on infinitesimals. In this paper, we sketch what such a formalism might look like. In
particular, we define a notion of finite procedure, called Ω-invariance, inside Nonstandard Analysis. We
also define three extra connectives V,V, and ∼, called hyperconnectives inside (classical) Nonstandard
Analysis.
We arrive at the definition of the hyperconnectives motivated by observations regarding infinitesimals
in the mathematical practice of physics and engineering listed after Example 1. As it turns out, our
new notion of algorithm and our new connectives bear a remarkable resemblance to the constructive
versions of algorithm and the connectives in BISH, i,e, Errett Bishop’s Constructive Analysis [2, 3].
Indeed, the definitions of V, V and ∼ follow the well-known BHK (Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmorgorov)
interpretation of intuitionistic logic [7], but with provability and algorithm replaced by Transfer and Ω-
invariance, respectively. In particular, we shall show that the hyperconnectives give rise to the same
equivalences of Constructive Reverse Mathematics [15] inside Nonstandard Analysis. The following
example is representative of our results.
Example 1. In BISH, LPO is the statement For all P ∈ Σ1, we have P∨¬P, i.e., the law of excluded
middle limited to Σ1-formulas. Also, LPR is the statement that (∀x∈R)(x> 0∨¬(x> 0)), the statement
that the continuum can be split in two parts. Now, BISH proves that LPO and LPR are equivalent, and
neither principle is provable in BISH, for obvious reasons. By Theorem 15, the equivalence between
LPR, i.e., (∀x ∈ R)(x > 0V∼(x > 0)) and LPO, i.e., the statement For all P ∈ Σ1, we have PV∼P
is provable in a suitably weak system of Nonstandard Analysis, called NSA, which can prove neither
principle outright.
Let us first consider two observations regarding the use of infinitesimals in physics. We assume the
reader enjoys basic familiarity with Nonstandard Analysis, pioneered by Abraham Robinson [21].
First of all, we argue that end results of calculations (involving infinitesimals) in physics do not
depend on the choice of the infinitesimal used. Indeed, in the course of providing a version of each of the
Big Five systems of Reverse Mathematics [27, 16], Keisler has shown that sets of natural numbers (or,
equivalently, real numbers) can be coded by infinite numbers, even in relatively weak systems2. Hence,
a particular infinite number ω can contain a lot of information, as it may, e.g., code the Halting Problem.
In this way, a formula ϕ(ω), which depends on ω , may not be decidable, even if ϕ has low complexity,
e.g., ∆0. However, for another infinite ω ′, say which codes the set of prime numbers, and the same ∆0-
formula ϕ , the formula ϕ(ω ′) would be intuitively decidable. This key insight gives rise to our notion of
finite procedure in Nonstandard Analysis in Definition 2.
Indeed, infinitesimals (which are the inverses of infinite numbers) are used freely in physics and
engineering, in an informal way. Nonetheless, they are generally believed to be mere calculus tools,
whose sole purpose is to simplify mathematical derivation and calculation. Furthermore, as physics and
engineering deal with the modeling of the physical world, the end result of a calculation (even using
‘ideal’ objects such as infinitesimals) should have real-world meaning. Thus, the physically meaningful
end result should not depend on the choice of infinitesimal used in the calculation, as common sense
dictates that the real world does not depend on our arbitrary choice of calculus tool (i.e., infinitesimal).
2In particular, Keisler has shown that the statement Every set of natural numbers X is coded by some infinite number x, can
be conservatively added to a nonstandard extension of RCA0. Furthermore, the addition of the statement Every infinite number
is the code for some set of natural numbers X , results in a nonstandard extension of WKL0.
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Simply put, if we repeat the same calculation with a different infinitesimal, we expect that we should
obtain the same result. Hence, our first observation is that the end results in physics do not depend on the
choice of infinitesimal used in their derivation. This is formalized directly in the notion of Ω-invariance:
our notion of finite procedure in Nonstandard Analysis, introduced in Definition 2 below.
Secondly, we consider a universal formula of the form (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n), with ϕ in ∆0. By Go¨del’s
famous incompleteness theorem (See, e.g., [7]), we know that, no matter how obvious, appealing, true,
natural, or convinving (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n) may seem, this formula may not be provable in the formal system
at hand. Indeed, the consistency of a given system T is a universal formula, and is in general not
provable in T . Hence, there might be (nonstandard) models in which there is a (nonstandard) n such that
¬ϕ(n). While Go¨del’s ‘unprovability’ results are extremely interesting from the point of view of logic
and mathematics, it is a phenomenon one would like to avoid in physics. Indeed, it seems intuitively
appealing that ‘ideal’ nonstandard elements (e.g., infinitesimals and infinite numbers) satisfy the same
properties as the ‘basic’ standard objects. This observation essentially dates back to Leibniz [1] and is
often called Leibniz’ law. It is formalized in the Transfer Principle of Nonstandard Analysis, but it turns
out that even weak versions of this principle have too great a logical strength for systems that pertain to
physical reality [25]. Furthermore, Theorem 11 and [18, Proposition 2.1] also suggest that the Transfer
Principle should be omitted.
Besides the Transfer Principle, another obvious way of circumventing the existence of nonstandard
counterexamples is to just demand (in the nonstandard model ∗N ofN at hand) that (∀n∈N)ϕ(n) satisfies
(∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)∧ [(∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)→ (∀n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n)], (1)
and to ignore (∀n ∈N)ϕ(n) otherwise. The previous constitutes our second observation, to be compared
to the definition of T below. In a sense, this is also the avenue taken in Constructive Analysis: unprovable
statements are essentially ignored by the very interpretation of the logical connectives.
2 A notion of finite procedure in Nonstandard Analysis
In this section, we introduce Ω-invariance, the formalization of the intuitive idea from Section 1 that end
results in physics do not depend on the choice of infinitesimals used. We show that Ω-invariance is quite
close to the notion of finite procedure.
With regard to notation, we take N = {0,1,2, . . .} to denote the set of natural numbers, which is
extended to ∗N = {0,1,2, . . . ,ω,ω + 1, . . .}, the set of hypernatural numbers, with ω 6∈ N. The set
Ω= ∗N\N consists of the infinite numbers, whereas the natural numbers are finite. Finally, a formula is
bounded or ‘∆0’, if all the quantifiers are bounded by terms and no infinite numbers occur.
Definition 2 (Ω-invariance). Let ψ(n,m) be ∆0 and fix ω ∈Ω.
The formula ψ(n,ω) is Ω-invariant if
(∀n ∈ N)(∀ω ′ ∈Ω)(ψ(n,ω)↔ ψ(n,ω ′)). (2)
For f : N×N→ N, the function f (n,ω) is called Ω-invariant, if
(∀n ∈ N)(∀ω ′ ∈Ω)( f (n,ω) = f (n,ω ′)). (3)
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As mentioned above, any object ϕ(ω) defined using an infinite numberω is potentially non-computable
or undecidable, as infinite numbers can code (non-recursive) sets of natural numbers. Hence, it is not
clear how an Ω-invariant object might be computable or constructive in any sense. However, although
an Ω-invariant object clearly involves an infinite number, the object does not depend on the choice of the
infinite number, by definition. Furthermore, by the following theorem, the truth value of ψ(n,ω) and the
value of f (n,ω) is already determined at some finite number.
Theorem 3 (Modulus lemma). For every Ω-invariant formula ψ(n,ω),
(∀n ∈ N)(∃m0 ∈ N)(∀m,m′ ∈ ∗N)[m,m′ ≥ m0→ ψ(n,m)↔ ψ(n,m′)].
For every Ω-invariant function f (n,ω), we have
(∀n ∈ N)(∃m0 ∈ N)(∀m,m′ ∈ ∗N)[m,m′ ≥ m0→ f (n,m) = f (n,m′)].
In each case, the number m0 is computed by an Ω-invariant function.
Proof. Follows easily using underspill for ∆0-formulas.
The previous theorem is called ‘modulus lemma’ as it bears a resemblance to the modulus lemma
from Recursion Theory [29, Lemma 3.2] Intuitively, our modulus lemma states that the properties of
an Ω-invariant object are already determined at some finite number. This observation suggests that the
notion of Ω-invariance models the notion of finite procedure.
Another way of interpreting Ω-invariance is as follows: Central to any version of constructivism is
that there are basic objects (e.g., the natural numbers) and there are certain basic operations on these
objects (e.g., recursive functions or constructive algorithms). All other objects are non-basic (aka ‘non-
constructive’ or ‘ideal’), and are to be avoided, as they fall outside the constructive world. It goes without
saying that infinite numbers in ∗N are ideals objects par excellence. Nonetheless, our modulus lemma
suggests that if an object does not depend on the choice of ideal element in its definition, it is not ideal,
but actually basic. This is the idea behind Ω-invariance: ideal objects can be basic if their definition does
not really depend on the choice of any particular ideal element. In this way, Ω-invariance approaches the
notion of finite procedure from above, while the usual methods work from the ground up by defining a
set of basic constructive operations and a method for combining/iterating these.
Finally, note that if (∀n∈N)ϕ(n) satisfies (1), then the formulaψ(ω)≡ (∀n≤ω)ϕ(n) isΩ-invariant.
Moreover, we have
ψ(ω)→ (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)∧¬ψ(ω)→ (∃n ∈ N)¬ϕ(n). (4)
Intuitively, the previous formula suggests that there is an Ω-invariant decision procedure for (∀n ∈
N)ϕ(n). Note that (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n) can be replaced by (∀n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n) in (4). This naturally leads to
the definition of T below in Defintion 7.
3 The base system NSA
In this section, we introduce the base theoryNSA in which we shall work. The systemNSA is inspired by
the theories ns-WKL0, ∗RCA0, ∗RCA′0, and ∗WKL0, introduced by Keita Yokoyama and Jerry Keisler
[28, 35, 34, 33, 16, 17] to apply techniques of Nonstandard Analysis in Reverse Mathematics. Like
Yokoyama’s system ns-WKL0, we consider more than two sorts, corresponding to the standard number
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variables, the nonstandard number variables, the standard set variables, and the nonstandard set variables.
The standard number and set variables are intended to range over the natural numbers, and subsets
thereof. The nonstandard number and set variables are intended to range over a nonstandard extension
of the natural numbers, and subsets thereof. Finally, there is an embedding from the standard structure
into the nonstandard structure, and the usual ‘star morphism’ ∗ from Nonstandard analysis behaves as
expected.
We shall denote the set of standard (or finite) numbers by N, and the set of nonstandard numbers by
∗N. The set Ω is ∗N \N, the set of infinite numbers. For brevity, we use more informal notation than
Yokoyama and Keisler.
Definition 4. [s-NSA]
1. (Induction) The axioms IΣ1 and ∗IΣ1.
2. (End Extension) The set ∗N is an end extension of N.
3. (Embedding) The standard structure is embedded in the nonstandard structure via an injective
homomorphism.
4. (Ω-CA): For all ψ(n,m) ∈ ∆0 and ω ∈Ω,
(∀n ∈ N)(∀ω ′ ∈Ω)[∗ψ(n,ω)↔ ∗ψ(n,ω ′)]→ (∃X ⊂ N)(∀n ∈ N)[∗ψ(n,ω)↔ n ∈ X ].
5. (∆0-TRANS): (∀n ∈ N)(∀X ⊂ N)[ϕ(n,X)↔ ∗ϕ(n,X)], for ϕ ∈ ∆0.
6. (∆0-underspill): (∀n ∈ N)(∀X ⊂ ∗N)[(∀ω ∈Ω)∗ϕ(n,X ,ω)→ (∃m ∈ N)ϕ(n,X ,m)].
Here, item 4 expresses that certain nonstandard objects (the Ω-invariant formulas) may be used to
define standard sets. Similar principles are usually called standard part principles [16]. Also, item 5
guarantees that functions defined on N (like 2n), are also defined on ∗N. We shall sometimes be sloppy
concerning the use of the star morphism ‘∗’. For instance, we just write 2ω instead of ∗2ω , if ω ∈Ω.
In light of our modulus lemma, the sets definable via comprehension in s-NSA are those for which
there is a finite procedure to decide elementhood. In practice, item 6 (underspill) in Definition 4 is never
used and may thus be omitted to ensure that not all ∆1-formulas are decidable. Finally, we assume that
s-NSA satisfies the following transfer rule: If s-NSA proves (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n), for ϕ ∈ ∆0, then s-NSA
proves (∀n ∈ ∗N)∗ϕ(n).
As it turns out, s-NSA does not suffice for our purposes. In particular, the binary distinction between
finite and infinite numbers is ‘too coarse’. We define NSA in the same way as s-NSA, but with at least
one explicit extension N1 such that N(N1 ( ∗N. The new extension N1 is connected to the other levels
by ∆0-transfer, in the same way as N and ∗N are, and underspill also holds between levels. The elements
of N1 are called ‘1-finite’ and the set Ω1 = ∗N \N1 consists of the ‘1-infinite’ numbers. Intuitively, the
set ∗N is stratified into two levels of infinity. Indeed, the elements of N1 \N are infinite, but they are
1-finite, and the elements of Ω1 are infinite and 1-infinite. The theory NSA is an example of stratified or
relative Nonstandard Analysis [20, 14, 13, 22, 23]. In case there are countably many Nk such that
N= N0 (N1 (N2 ( . . .Nk (Nk+1 ( · · ·( ∗N,
then for k = 0, the index ‘0’ is usually omitted, i.e., N=N0 consists of the finite numbers andΩ= ∗N\N
are the infinite numbers.
Finally, we consider the following Transfer Principle, not available in NSA, but needed below.
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Principle 5 (Π1-TRANS). For all ϕ in ∆0, we have
(∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)→ (∀n ∈ ∗N)∗ϕ(n). (5)
We always assume that ∆0-formulas may contain standard sets and numbers as parameters.
4 Reverse-engineering Constructive Reverse Mathematics
Constructive Reverse Mathematics is a spin-off from Harvey Friedman’s famous Reverse Mathematics
program [10, 11] where the base theory is (based on) BISH. In this section, we define the new hypercon-
nectives and show that many of the well-known principles from Constructive Reverse Mathematics (e.g.,
LPO and MP) satisfy the same equivalences as their counterparts inside NSA (e.g., LPO and MP). The
latter are obtained from the former by simply replacing the usual connectives by the new hyperconnec-
tives as in Example 1.
Definition 6. [Hyperconnectives] For formulas A and B,
1. AV B is defined as [A∧A ∈ T]→ [B∧B ∈ T],
2. ∼A is defined as AV 0 = 1,
3. AVB is defined as There is an Ω-invariant formula ψ(~x,ω) such that
(∀~x ∈ Nk)(ψ(~x,ω)→ [A(~x)∧A(~x) ∈ T]∧¬ψ(~x,ω)→ [B(~x)∧B(~x) ∈ T]), (6)
for formulas A,B involving parameters~x ∈ Nk.
The third connective is called ‘hyperdisjunction’, the second and third one are called ‘hyperimpli-
cation’ and ‘hypernegation’. Obviously, this definition hinges on the definition of T. Intuitively, for
suitable A, the formula ‘A ∈ T’ expresses that A satisfies the transfer principle of Nonstandard Analysis.
For brevity, we give the definition of T up to Σ2∪Π2-formulas. The definition for higher complexity is
analogous, straightforward, and clear from the following definition.
Definition 7. [The set T] For ϕ ∈ ∆0, we define
1. The formula (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n) ∈ T is (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)→ (∀n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n).
2. The formula (∃n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n) ∈ T is (∃n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n)→ (∃n ∈ N1)ϕ(n).
3. The formula (∀n ∈ N)(∃m ∈ N)ϕ(n,m) ∈ T is
(∀n ∈ N)(∃m ∈ N)ϕ(n,m)→ (∀n ∈ ∗N)(∃m ∈ ∗N)[m is n-finite∧ϕ(n,m)].
4. The formula (∃n ∈ ∗N)(∀m ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n,m) ∈ T is
(∃n ∈ ∗N)(∀m ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n,m)→ (∃n ∈ N1)(∀m ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n,m).
5. For formulas A not suitable for transfer, like (∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n), (∃n ∈ N1)ϕ(n), 0 = 1, and (∀n ∈
∗N)ϕ(n), the formula A ∈ T is just 0 = 0. In this case, A ∈ T is called ‘trivial’.
Note that universal formulas in T ‘maximally’ satisfy the transfer principle3, but existential formulas
only satisfy the transfer principle maximally minus one level. With the above definitions, it is clear that
V, V and ∼ follow the well-known BHK interpretation of intuitionistic logic [7], but with provability
and algorithm replaced by Transfer and Ω-invariance, respectively.
3E.g. we have (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)→ (∀n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n), and not (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)→ (∀n ∈ N1)ϕ(n).
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Remark 8. An alternative definition of hyperdisjunction is the following:
AV B≡ ([A∨B]∧ [A→ A ∈ T]∧ [B→ B ∈ T]).
For V instead of V, we would obtain results similar to the ones below, except that LPO, LLPO,WLPO,
andMP would all be equivalent to Π1-TRANS. Intuitively, this corresponds to the extreme intuitionistic
view that LPO, LLPO, WLPO and MP are all equally ‘false’ principles.
Remark 9. The definition of V is based on the observation that Π1-TRANS is a kind of ‘hyperexcluded
middle’: it excludes the possibility that (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)∧ (∃n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n). This informal observation is
formalized in Example 1 and Theorem 11. Moreover, given Π1-TRANS, (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n) is equivalent
to (∀n ≤ ω)ϕ(n), for any choice of ω ∈ Ω, as noted in [24, 25]. Hence, an Ω-invariant formula can
decide if (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n) is true or not, suggesting (6). Furthermore, under certain conditions, if a system
of Nonstandard Analysis T ns proves a standard universal formula (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n), then T ns also proves
(∀n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n), i.e., we have (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n) ∈ T. In light of the BHK-interpretation of implication, the
previous observation motivates the definition of T andV.
4.1 Limited Omniscience
In this paragraph, we consider LPO, the Limited Principle of Omniscience, which is the Law of Excluded
Middle (LEM), limited to Σ1-formulas. This principle is considered to be the original sin of classical
mathematics according to constructivist canon [12, 2].
Principle 10 (LPO). For all P ∈ Σ1, we have PV∼P.
Theorem 11. In NSA, LPO is equivalent to Π1-TRANS.
Proof. Assume LPO and let ϕ(n,~x) be as in Π1-TRANS with all parameters ~x ∈ Nk shown. Then we
have
(∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n,~x)V∼[(∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n,~x)]. (7)
By definition, ∼[(∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n,~x)] is (∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n,~x)V 0 = 1, which is[
(∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n,~x)∧ [(∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n,~x) ∈ T]]→ [0 = 1∧ [0 = 1 ∈ T]], (8)
again by definition. As neither (∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n,~x) nor 0 = 1 is suitable for transfer, (8) reduces to (∃n ∈
N)ϕ(n,~x)→ 0 = 1, i.e., (∀n ∈ N)¬ϕ(n,~x). Indeed, by definition, the formulas (∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n,~x) ∈ T
and 0 = 1 ∈ T are 0 = 0, i.e., trivial. Again by definition, (7) implies the existence of some Ω-invariant
ψ(~x,ω) such that, for all~x ∈ Nk,
ψ(~x,ω)→ (∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n,~x)
∧ (9)
¬ψ(~x,ω)→ [(∀n ∈ N)¬ϕ(n,~x)∧ [(∀n ∈ N)¬ϕ(n,~x)→ (∀n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n,~x)]].
Note that the innermost square-bracketed subformula is (∀n ∈ N)¬ϕ(n) ∈ T. Now suppose (∃n ∈
∗N)ϕ(n,~x0) for some fixed~x0 ∈Nk, and consider (9). Then ¬ψ(~x0,ω) would imply (∀n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n,~x0),
which is impossible. However, ψ(~x0,ω) implies (∃n∈N)ϕ(n,~x0), and we have derived (∃n∈ ∗N)ϕ(n,~x0)→
(∃n ∈N)ϕ(n,~x0), an instance of Π1-TRANS, using (9), i.e., LPO. Hence LPO implies Π1-TRANS and
this case is done.
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For the reverse direction, assume Π1-TRANS and let ϕ(n,~x) be as in LPO. By Π1-TRANS, (∃n ∈
N)ϕ(n,~x) is equivalent to (∃n ≤ ω)ϕ(n,~x), for any ω ∈ Ω and ~x ∈ Nk. In other words, the formula
ψ(~x,ω)≡ (∃n≤ ω)ϕ(n,~x) is Ω-invariant and satisfies (9). As the latter is equivalent to (7), an instance
of LPO, we obtain the latter principle.
To consider principles regarding real numbers, we first need to define these objects. We use the usual
definition involving fast-converging sequences from [27].
Definition 12 (Real number). A real number is a sequence of rationals (qn) s.t. (∀k, i ∈N)(|qk−qk+i|<
1
2k ). Two reals x = (qn) and y = (rn) are equal, i.e., x = y, if (∀k ∈ N)(|qk − rk| ≤ 12k−1 ), x < y is
(∃k ∈ N)(qk + 12k < rk), and x≥ y is ¬(x < y).
Notation 13. The reals x and y are always assumed to be given as x = (qn) and y = (rn), for sequences
qn,rn : N→Q.
We now consider the following principle.
Principle 14 (LPR). (∀x ∈ R)(x > 0V∼(x > 0)).
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 15. In NSA, LPO is equivalent to LPR.
Proof. For the forward direction, we may assume Π1-TRANS, by Theorem 11. By definition, x > 0 is
(∃n ∈ N)(qn > 12n ), and ∼(x > 0) is (∀n ∈ N)(qn ≤ 12n ). In the same way as in the proof of Theorem 11,
the formula ψ(ω)≡ (∃n≤ ω)(qn > 12n ) is equivalent to x > 0, by Π1-TRANS. Note that qn, and hence
ψ , may depend on standard parameters~x ∈ Nk which are not shown. By the above, we have
ψ(ω)→ (x > 0)∧¬ψ(ω)→∼(x > 0).
By definition, x > 0 ∈ T is trivial and, by Π1-TRANS, we have ∼(x > 0) ∈ T, as the latter is just
(∀n ∈ N)(qn ≤ 12n )→ (∀n ∈ ∗N)(qn ≤ 12n ). Hence, x > 0V∼(x > 0) follows immediately. Finally, for
the formula (∀x)(x∈RV x> 0V∼(x> 0)), simply applyΠ1-transfer to ‘x∈R’, which isΠ1, to observe
that the latter is in T.
For the reverse direction, assume LPR, and let ϕ be as in Π1-TRANS. Now define4 the real x as
qn := ∑ni=0
1
2i Tψ(i), for ψ(i) defined as (∃m ≤ i)ϕ(m). Note that x indeed satisfies the definition of real
number from Definition 12, as we have
(∀n,m ∈ N)(m < n→ |qm−qn| ≤ ∑ni=m+1 12i < 12m ).
Note that the previous formula is also valid for ∗N instead of N. In other words, ‘x ∈ R’ is in T.
By LPR, we either have x > 0, i.e., (∃n ∈N)(qn > 12n ), or ∼(x > 0), i.e., (∀n ∈N)(qn ≤ 12n ), and the
fact that ∼(x > 0) is in T. The latter is
(∀n ∈ N)(qn ≤ 12n )→ (∀n ∈ ∗N)(qn ≤ 12n ). (10)
Thus, if (∀n ∈ N)¬ϕ(n), then qn = 0, for n ∈ N, and also (∀n ∈ N)(qn ≤ 12n ). By (10), we have (∀n ∈∗N)(qn ≤ 12n ), which implies that (∀n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n). Indeed, if (∃n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n), say we have ϕ(n0), then
qn > qn0 ≥ 12n0 , for all n> n0. Hence, we have qn0+1 > 12n0+1 , which would contradict (∀n∈ ∗N)(qn≤ 12n ).
Thus, given LPR, the formula (∀n ∈ N)¬ϕ(n) implies (∀n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n), which is an instance of
Π1-TRANS. By Theorem 11, LPO follows and we are done.
4For ϕ ∈ ∆0, there is a function Tϕ which is 0 or 1 depending on whether ϕ is false or true.
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Corollary 16. In NSA, we have both LPO↔ LPR and LPOWV LPR.
Proof. The first equivalence was proved in the theorem. For the second (hyper)equivalence, we note
that LPOWV LPR reduces to LPO↔ LPR, as both LPO and LPR are not (equivalent to) standard
formulas. Indeed, otherwise NSA would include Π1-TRANS, which is not the case.
We assume the usual (classical) definitions of sequence of reals, Cauchy sequence, convergent and
increasing sequence.
Principle 17 (MCT). If xn is a bounded and increasing sequence of reals, then xn converges to a limit:
(∀n ∈ N)(xn ≤ xn+1)∧ (∃N ∈ N)(∀n ∈ N)(xn ≤ N)V
(11)
(∃x ∈ R)(∀k ∈ N)(∃M ∈ N)(∀m ∈ N)(m≥MV |xm− x| ≤ 1k )
Theorem 18. In NSA,MCT is equivalent to LPO.
Proof. We first prove the forward implication. It is not difficult to prove thatMCT is equivalent to
(∀n ∈ N)(xn ≤ xn+1)∧ (∃N ∈ N)(∀n ∈ N)(xn ≤ N)V
(12)
(∀k ∈ N)(∃M ∈ N)(∀m,m′ ∈ N)(m,m′ ≥MV |xm− xm′ | ≤ 1k ),
as a sequence is convergent if and only if it is a Cauchy sequence5. Note that the latter equivalence is
meant in the sense of hyperimplication instead of implication.
It suffices to proveΠ1-TRANS, by Theorem 11. Let ϕ be in ∆0 and assume (∀n∈N)ϕ(n). Let wn be
an increasing sequence of reals which is bounded above by B ∈N and convergent to w ∈R. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that the formulas (∀n∈N)(wn≤wn+1) and (∃N ∈N)(∀n∈N)(wn≤N) are
in T. Note that the predicate ‘≤’ in the previous formulas does not increase their quantifier complexity
(resp. Π1 and Σ2). We define
zn :=
{
wn if (∀m≤ n)ϕ(n)
w+∑ni=1
B+1−w
2i otherwise
.
Then, zn is bounded and increasing, by assumption. Also, by the definition of zn, the formulas (∀n ∈
N)(zn ≤ zn+1) and (∀n ∈N)(zn ≤ B+1) are in T. ByMCT, we have the consequent of (12), and the fact
that this formula is in T. This yields
(∀k ∈ ∗N)(∃M ∈ ∗N∧M is k-finite )(∀m,m′ ∈ ∗N)(m,m′ ≥MV |zm− zm′ | ≤ 1k ),
by definition. We tacitly assume that the universal quantifier hidden in the final predicate ‘≤’ of the
previous formula has been adjusted in the right way. Hence,
(∀k ∈ N)(∃M ∈ N)(∀m,m′ ∈ ∗N)(m,m′ ≥MV |zm− zm′ | ≤ 1k ), (13)
Now if ¬ϕ(n0) for some n0 ∈ ∗N, then zn0 > w+ 12 . However, applying (13) for k = 12 , there is some
M2 ∈ N such that zM2 (= wM2 ≤ w) and zn0 satisfy |zn0 − zM2 | ≤ 12 , which is a contradiction. Hence, we
must have ϕ(n), for all n ∈ ∗N if (∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n), which yields Π1-TRANS.
5Incidentally, this is a theorem of BISH, to be found in [2, Theorem 3.3].
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For the forward implication, the usual ‘interval halving technique’ can be easily adapted to derive
MCT fromΠ1-TRANS. Indeed, by the latter, a Σ1-formulaΦ(~x) is equivalent to anΩ-invariant formula,
and Ω-CA provides a function f (~x) such that f (~x) = 1↔ Φ(~x), for standard parameters ~x. Hence,
inequalities between real numbers, which are Σ1 in general, become decidable and the usual interval
halving argument can be performed in NSA+Π1-TRANS.
Remark 19. As it happens, formula (13) has a constructive interpretation akin to the definition of Cauchy
sequence in BISH. Indeed, Bishop defines a Cauchy sequence by the usual Π3-definition
(∀k ∈ N)(∃M ∈ N)(∀m,m′ ∈ N)(m,m′ ≥M→ |zm− zm′ | ≤ 1k ), (14)
with the extra assumption that there is some sequence Mk witnessing the existential quantifier. The latter
sequence is usually called a modulus. Now, given (13), the N→ N-sequence6
g(k) = (µM ≤ ω)(∀m,m′ ≤ ω)(m,m′ ≥MV |zm− zm′ | ≤ 1k ),
is Ω-invariant. Using Ω-CA, we obtain a standard function f such that f (k) = g(k), for k ∈ N. This
yields
(∀k ∈ N)(∀m,m′ ∈ N)(m,m′ ≥ f (k)V |zm− zm′ | ≤ 1k ),
i.e., f is a modulus for zm. As the latter formula is equivalent to (14), it is also in T.
4.2 Markov’s principle
In this paragraph, we consider Markov’s principle. This principle is rejected in Constructive Analysis,
but accepted in the Markovian school of recursive mathematics (See [6, p. 10-11]).
Principle 20 (MP). For P in Σ1, we have ∼∼PV P.
Note thatMP corresponds to double-negation elimination for Σ1-formulas
Principle 21 (MPR). (∀x ∈ R)(∼∼(x > 0)V x > 0).
Let (Π1-TRANS)1 be Π1-transfer limited to N1, i.e., in (5), we replace ∗N by N1. We have the
following theorem.
Theorem 22. In NSA,MP is equivalent toMPR, and to (Π1-TRANS)1
Proof. For ϕ in ∆0, the formula∼∼[(∃n∈N)ϕ(n)] is (∃n∈ ∗N)ϕ(n). Hence,MP for this formula yields[
(∃n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n)∧ [(∃n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n)→ (∃n ∈ N1)ϕ(n)]
]→ (∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n), (15)
which reduces to (∃n ∈ N1)ϕ(n)→ (∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n). What is left to prove is thatMPR impliesMP.
Hence, let ϕ be ∆0 and assume that ∼∼[(∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n)], i.e., (∃n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n), and that this formula is
in T. By (15), this yields (∃n ∈ N1)ϕ(n). Now define the real x as qn := ∑ni=0 12i Tψ(i), for ψ(i) defined
as (∃m ≤ i)ϕ(m), i.e., as in the proof of Theorem 15. Note that we also have that ‘x ∈ R’ is in T. Now
let n1 ∈ N1 be such that ϕ(n1). Then qn > qn1 ≥ 12n1 , for all n > n1, and we have qn1+1 > 12n1+1 , i.e.,
(∃n ∈ N1)(qn > 2n), which is easily seen to be ∼∼(x > 0). By MPR, we have x > 0, implying that
(∃n ∈ N)ϕ(n). Hence,MP follows and we are done.
6As in the previous proof, we assume that the final predicate ‘≤’ has been adjusted in the right way.
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By the previous theorem, MP is not provable in NSA, and weaker than LPO. It is not difficult to
produce models of NSA in which, e.g., MP (and hence LPO) fails, or where MP holds, but LPO fails.
Hence,MP is strictly weaker than LPO. Similar results exists for other principles, such asWLPO.
Furthermore, it can be shown that 1-formulas7 are Ω-invariant in the presence of MP. Hence, by
the absence of MP in NSA, it would seem that not all 1-formulas correspond to ‘finite procedures’,
if the latter is interpreted as Ω-invariant procedures. Similarly, not all recursive operations are finite
procedures8 in BISH as Markov’s principle is rejected [6, p. 10-11]. Hence, we observe a deep similarity
here between NSA and BISH.
Finally, as is the case in Constructive Analysis, double-negation elimination forΠ1-formulas is prov-
able in the base theory.
Theorem 23. In NSA, we have ∼∼RV R and ∼∼R→ R, for all R in Π1.
Proof. Let ϕ be ∆0 and consider ∼[(∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)]. By definition, the latter is just (∃n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n).
Hence, ∼∼[(∀n ∈ N)ϕ(n)] is (∃n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n)V 0 = 1, i.e.,[
(∃n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n)[(∃n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n)→ (∃n ∈ N1)¬ϕ(n)]
]→ 0 = 1,
which yields
(∀n ∈ ∗N)ϕ(n)∨ [(∃n ∈ ∗N)¬ϕ(n)∧ (∀n ∈ N1)ϕ(n)].
The latter is just (∀n ∈ N1)ϕ(n). The theorem now follows easily.
4.3 Concluding remarks
In the previous section, we obtained several equivalences in NSA which are very reminiscent of Con-
structive Reverse Mathematics. Obviously, these results do not even scratch the surface, and we could
prove many more equivalences, given more space (e.g., for LLPO, WLPO, WMP, MP∨, FAN∆, . . . ). In
particular, we could obtain most equivalences in Hajime Ishihara’s survey paper [15] of Constructive
Reverse Mathematics in the same way. The following theorem provides an example.
Theorem 24. In NSA, the following are equivalent.
1. LLPO: ∼(P∧Q)V∼PV∼Q (P,Q ∈ Σ1).
2. LLPR: (∀x ∈ R)[∼(x > 0)V∼(x < 0)].
3. NIL: (∀x,y ∈ R)(xy = 0V x = 0Vy = 0).
4. CLO: For all x,y ∈ R with ∼(x < y), {x,y} is a closed set.
5. IVT: a version of the intermediate value theorem.
6. WEI: a version of the Weierstraß extremum theorem.
In NSA, the following are equivalent.
1. WLPO: (∼∼P)VP (P ∈ Σ1).
2. WLPO: (∀x ∈ R)[∼∼(x > 0)V(x > 0)].
7A formula ϕ is 1 if there are ϕ1 ∈Π1 and ϕ2 ∈ Σ1 such that ϕ WV ϕ1WV ϕ2.
8An example is a Turing machine M for which it is impossible that it does not hold. As no algorithmic upper bound on the
halting time of M is given, we cannot conclude that M halts in BISH.
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3. DISC: There exists a discontinuous function from 2N to N.
Remark 25. In 1999, a conference entitled Reuniting the antipodes was organized in Venice [26]. The
goal of this meeting was to bring together the communities of Nonstandard Analysis and Constructive
Analysis in order to discover common ground. In [31], the review of [9], van Oosten states that little
common ground had been found. He suggests, however, one notable exception: Erik Palmgren, who
indeed has been developing Nonstandard Analysis inside the constructive framework (See, e.g., [18, 19]).
This paper’s approach, although dual in nature, can also been as an attempt at ‘reuniting the antipodes’.
In particular, despite Bishop’s rather negative remarks regarding Nonstandard Analysis [4], the results in
this paper can be interpreted positively, namely as providing Bishop’s notion of algorithm with a certain
robustness.
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